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State, county, and city governments across the country have filed 
hundreds of lawsuits against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and 
retailers.  The odds are high that these lawsuits will culminate in a “global 
settlement agreement” that requires the defendants to pay billions of 
dollars to states and localities that have been harmed by the opioid 
epidemic.  Though much of that money will—and should—be spent to 
reimburse communities for opioid-related costs they have already 
incurred, such a settlement would also provide a tremendous opportunity 
to strengthen the nation’s public health system infrastructure in order to 
better protect against future public health challenges.  The experience of 
the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the major tobacco 
companies, however, suggests that setting aside funds for public health 
will not be easy.  This article reviews the history of how states spent their 
MSA funds, with a focus on the efforts of public health advocates to ensure 
that some portion of the funds were spent on tobacco prevention and 
cessation.  These efforts were, in many cases, successful in the short term, 
but they were not sustained over time.  This article will summarize lessons 




Whenever a new state or locality files a lawsuit against opioid 
manufacturers and distributors, commentators and journalists inevitably 
mention the parallels to the states’ litigation against the tobacco industry 
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in the 1990s.1  The latter litigation culminated in the 1998 Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) between forty-six states and the major 
cigarette companies, which imposed numerous restrictions on tobacco 
industry conduct and also mandated massive payments from the tobacco 
companies to the settling states—more than $200 billion over the first 
twenty-five years of the agreement.2 
Although the MSA funds were intended in part to reimburse the states 
for money already spent to cover smoking-related medical expenses, the 
attorneys general who signed the MSA made it clear that a major goal of 
the agreement was to fund public health efforts that would help current 
smokers to quit and prevent kids from starting to smoke.3  In one typical 
example, Oregon Attorney General Hardy Myers said, “I am hoping that 
[the governor] and lawmakers, understanding the direct link between 
tobacco use and increased health care costs, will invest the proceeds in 
health care, namely, smoking cessation and prevention programs and 
increased access to health care.”4 
In the current opioid litigation, the public officials bringing these 
lawsuits and the outside counsel working with them have been making 
similar statements about their intentions.5  For instance, Mike Moore, who 
                                                          
 1.   See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Ohio Opioid Suit Echoes Tobacco Cases, WALL. ST. J. (May 31, 
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ohio-opioid-suit-echoes-tobacco-cases-1496275673 
[https://perma.cc/SZE5-CJB7]; Casey McDermott, In N.H. Opioid Lawsuit, Echoers of Past Battles 
Against Tobacco, Other Industries, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Aug. 11, 2017),  https://www.nhpr.org/post/nh-
opioid-lawsuit-echoes-past-battles-against-tobacco-other-industries#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/ 
TYT4-9N5U]; John Pacenti, Opioid Crisis: Cities, States Use Tobacco Playbook to Sue Big Pharma, 
PALM BEACH POST (May 25, 2018),  https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/crime—law/opioid-
crisis-cities-states-use-tobacco-playbook-sue-big-pharma/rQReMHP7Ezgqa8h7YMb19H/ 
[https://perma.cc/4FHF-D4NU].  In some cases, the lawsuits themselves have explicitly referenced 
the tobacco industry.  See Complaint at 18, Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., et al., No. 17-CI-261  (Ross 
Cnty. Ct. of C.P. May 31, 2017), https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Briefing-Room/News-
Releases/Consumer-Protection/2017-05-31-Final-Complaint-with-Sig-Page.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
C3YQ-EM8U] (alleging that “[l]ike the tobacco companies, Defendants used third parties that they 
funded, directed, and controlled to carry out and conceal their scheme to deceive doctors and patients 
about the risks and benefits of long-term opioid use for chronic pain.”). 
 2.   See National Association of Attorneys General, Master Settlement Agreement (1998),  
https://www.naag.org/assets/redesign/files/msa-tobacco/MSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PJJ-XLJ7] 
[hereinafter MSA]. 
 3.   See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Using Tobacco Settlement funds for Tobacco 
Prevention: Supportive Quotes from High-Ranking State Officials (Jan. 22, 1999), 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0120.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQF5-2ETX] 
(collecting quotes). 
 4.   Id. at 6. 
 5.   See, e.g., Brian Mann, Opioid-Makers Face Wave of Lawsuits in 2019, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO  
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/31/680741170/opioid-makers-face-wave-of-lawsuits-
in-2019 [https://perma.cc/P7NM-VASL] (“Local and state officials say they desperately need [an 
MSA-like] cash settlement to solve this crisis . . . . A settlement worth tens of billions of dollars could 
revolutionize the national response, creating more drug rehab programs, detox beds, and more training 
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filed the first state lawsuit against the tobacco industry as Mississippi 
Attorney General and is now, as an attorney in private practice, helping to 
coordinate opioid litigation for the plaintiff states and localities, recently 
said, “We cannot fail in making sure whatever dollars we get in a 
resolution go to treatment and emergency response and education.”6 
But despite the stated intentions of those involved in the tobacco 
litigation, only a small percentage of the MSA proceeds has gone towards 
tobacco prevention and cessation.  As summarized in a recent Politico 
article: 
Only a pittance of the billions in tobacco company payouts has been 
spent on combating tobacco use.  Instead, much of the money, which the 
industry continues to pay out, is plowed into state slush funds and used 
to patch budget shortfalls.  In the most extreme cases, states sacrificed 
future payments for much smaller, but immediate infusions of cash to 
pay workers, or build schools and roads.7 
The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids estimates that since the payments 
began, states have spent only 2.6% of their revenue from the MSA and 
tobacco taxes on tobacco-related programming.8 
As the opioid litigation moves towards what many predict will be a 
massive “global settlement” that resolves most of the cases brought by 
governmental entities,9 this article looks back at what happened to the 
                                                          
for first responders.”). 
 6.   Paul Demko, Opioid Court Fights Risk Repeating Tobacco’s Failures, POLITICO (May 24, 
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/24/opioids-epidemic-tobacco-607119 
[https://perma.cc/LH8R-ZQH2] (additionally quoting Connecticut’s chief deputy attorney general as 
saying, “We think it’s incumbent upon all of us to get a reasonable deal that bends the curve on the 
crisis”).  Moore also recently said, “‘Success for me would be that we would find funding to provide 
treatment for all the 2.5 million opioid-dependent people in the country.’”  Bill Whitaker, Opioid 
Crisis: The Lawsuits That Could Bankrupt Manufacturers and Distributors, CBS NEWS (Dec. 16, 
2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/opioid-crisis-attorney-mike-moore-takes-on-manufacturers-
and-distributors-at-the-center-of-the-epidemic-60-minutes/ [https://perma.cc/9PP3-ALJR].  
 7.   Demko, supra note 6. 
 8.   Matthew L. Myers, On the 20th Anniversary of the State Tobacco Settlement (The MSA), It’s 
Time for Bold Action to Finish the Fight Against Tobacco, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Nov. 
26, 2018), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/2018_11_26_msa20 
 [https://perma.cc/9G6T-H275].  This amount includes both MSA payments and revenue from tobacco 
taxes.  In most cases, both types of funds are placed into a general revenue fund and then a legislative 
appropriation is made for tobacco control efforts, so it is impossible to determine what is being spent 
from MSA funds as opposed to tax revenue.  The 2.6% figure equates to approximately $11.1 billion 
spent on state tobacco prevention and cessation efforts since FY (Fiscal Year) 2000.  To place that 
amount in context, the tobacco industry spent $9.5 billion in 2016 alone on marketing its products in 
the United States.  See Tobacco Industry Marketing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/tobacco_industry/marketing/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TD24-4F7X] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).   
 9.   See Jan Hoffman, Opioid Lawsuits are Headed to Trial.  Here’s Why the Stakes Are Getting 
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MSA settlement funds.  It then considers whether the (generally 
unsuccessful) efforts to ensure that MSA proceeds were used to advance 
public health provide lessons that can inform any future settlements with 
opioid manufacturers and distributors.  Part I provides a brief overview of 
the current litigation against opioid-related companies and the past 
litigation against the tobacco industry.  Next, Part II discusses the MSA, 
focusing on the states’ allocation of settlement proceeds and the role the 
non-governmental tobacco prevention foundation established as part of the 
settlement agreement.  Part III concludes the article with a discussion of 
how proceeds from an opioid settlement agreement might be better 
protected against diversion away from their intended purpose.10 
I. THE TOBACCO AND OPIOID LAWSUITS 
Against the background of decades of largely failed attempts by 
individual smokers to hold the tobacco industry liable in court, state 
attorneys general attempted a new tactic.11  “In essence, the states’ legal 
theories, which later came to include statutorily based claims, such as 
violation of consumer protection laws, asserted that the industry’s 
deceptive and misleading conduct constituted a wrong against the 
public.”12  In other words, the states alleged that they were being forced to 
pay smoking-related health care costs that should properly be the 
                                                          
Uglier, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/30/health/opioid-lawsuits-
settlement-trial.html [https://perma.cc/J7PD-XZ74] (“The defendants want a global settlement—a 
comprehensive agreement that will indemnify them against further lawsuits.  The multidistrict 
litigation, with all the federal cases, is positioned for that goal.”); Daniel Fisher, Plaintiff Lawyers See 
Nationwide Settlement As Only End For Opioid Lawsuits, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/06/plaintiff-lawyers-see-nationwide-settlement-
as-only-end-for-opioid-lawsuits/#7bc8025c7bc2 [https://perma.cc/62C4-2KGZ].  
 10.   To be clear, there are other potential public health benefits that can flow from public sector 
litigation and resulting settlement agreements, apart from the recovery of funds.  At the same time, it 
is important not to overstate these benefits.  See Derek Carr, Corey S. Davis & Lainie Rutkow, 
Reducing Harm Through Litigation Against Opioid Manufacturers? Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 
133 PUB. HEALTH REP. 207, 210 (2018) (arguing that although there are many potential benefits from 
public health litigation, “from a public health standpoint, they do not necessarily accomplish more 
than could be achieved through legislation or regulation and often take far longer”).   
 11.   Individual lawsuits were unsuccessful in large part because of the “calculated ‘scorched 
earth’ strategy in which tobacco companies made every case prohibitively expensive for even the most 
determined litigants.”  D. Douglas Blanke, Towards Health with Justice: Litigation and Public 
Inquiries and Tools for Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 8 (2002), 
https://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/who-tobacco-litigation-2002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XKP9-WK5C].  One theory underlying the state litigation was that by working 
together (and relying on outside counsel working on contingency) the states could amass sufficient 
resources to neutralize the tobacco industry’s ability to simply wear down the opposition. 
 12.   Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 
337 (2001). 
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responsibility of the cigarette companies, given their history of lying to the 
public about the addictiveness of nicotine, marketing to youth, suppressing 
information about the dangers of smoking, and more. 
Because the states alleged that they had been directly harmed by the 
tobacco industry’s misconduct, under the states’ theory “smokers’ 
conduct, or their knowledge of the health risks, was not a defense . . . .”13  
As Robert Rabin writes, “In reality, these [legal] theories were largely 
untested, and the claim that the state’s interest was independent of and 
distinct from the individual smoker’s generally rested on a shaky 
foundation.”14  But as state after state filed suit, the industry—which had 
been able to use its superior resources to overpower individual litigants—
started to feel pressure to settle.15  Pressure for a settlement built as the 
State of Minnesota succeeded in prying loose documents that the tobacco 
industry had sought to withhold based on misleading or fraudulent claims 
of attorney-client privilege, further confirming a decades-long pattern of 
misconduct.16 
The opioid litigation now being brought by states, localities, and tribal 
entities is, in some ways, built on a similar legal foundation.17  Though 
they are based on diverse legal doctrines and statutory claims, these 
lawsuits all similarly rely on the theory that governments are spending 
billions of dollars to address an opioid epidemic that is, at least in large 
part, caused by the misconduct of the defendants—and the defendants 
therefore should be responsible for reimbursing those costs.18  As in the 
tobacco cases, some of the underlying legal theories are untested,19 but the 
                                                          
 13.   Blanke, supra note 11, at 25. 
 14.   Rabin, supra note 12, at 337. 
 15.   Id. at 338 (“What the industry was willing to buy, at a very considerable price, was relief 
from litigation uncertainty.”). 
 16.   See Michael V. Ciresi, Roberta B. Walburn & Tara D. Sutton, Decades of Deceit: Document 
Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477, 478 (1999).  The 
Minnesota litigation ultimately “resulted in the production of approximately thirty-five million pages 
of internal industry documents.”  Id. at 479. 
 17.   The details of this litigation will not be reviewed in depth here but are well detailed in 
another article in this issue.  See generally Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the 
Opioid Crisis on Local Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. Kan. 
L. Rev. 1061 (2019) (discussing how local governments could potentially quantify the impact of the 
opioid crisis). 
 18.   More specifically, the plaintiffs focus on two primary allegations.  “First, the manufacturers 
overstated the benefits and downplayed the risks of the use of their opioids while aggressively 
marketing them (the overpromotion claim); and second, that the distributors failed to monitor or detect 
suspicious orders (the diversion claim).”  Nicolas P. Terry, The Opioid Litigation Unicorn, 70 S.C. L. 
REV. 637, 639 (2019).  
 19.   One main untested issue is whether or not the plaintiffs can rely on aggregate state/municipal 
costs, or whether they have to identify specific individuals who were harmed by the alleged 
misconduct.  The defendants’ discovery requests suggest that they plan to press this issue.  See 
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steady accumulation of more and more lawsuits raises the stakes and 
builds pressure for a settlement. 
Another important similarity is that both the state tobacco litigation 
and the current opioid lawsuits are being pursued, on behalf of the plaintiff 
government entities, by private attorneys who are operating on a 
contingency fee basis.  If there is a large settlement (which some have 
estimated might be in the range of $50 billion20), these plaintiffs’ attorneys 
stand to gain hundreds of millions of dollars.21  In a general sense, this 
aligns their interests with those of the states and localities they represent, 
who want to recoup as much money as possible, but it does not give them 
an incentive to ensure that any resulting proceeds are used for addiction 
treatment, harm reduction, or to address the root causes of the opioid 
epidemic.22 
There are important differences between the two lines of cases as well.  
For one, the opioid companies’ legal defenses may be considerably 
stronger than the tobacco industry’s were.  Unlike tobacco, which was 
virtually unregulated at the federal level at the time of the state lawsuits, 
“federal laws such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act regulate nearly 
every aspect of the prescription drug market, and the Controlled 
Substances Act subjects certain drugs, including [opioid pain relievers] to 
even stricter regulation.”23  Intensive federal regulation may allow for a 
variety of legal defenses, including claims of federal preemption.  The 
                                                          
Hoffman, supra note 9 (“[T]he drug industry is asking for patients’ records and for every prescription 
the plaintiffs deemed medically ‘suspicious.’”). 
 20.   Andrew Harris, Jared Hopkins & Hannah Recht, Justice for Opioid Communities Means 
Massive Payday for Their Lawyers, BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
graphics/2018-opioid-lawsuits/?srnd=prognosis. 
 21.   Id. (“In the fee arrangements reviewed by Bloomberg, the lead lawyers and the dozens of 
other firms joining them are generally slated to receive anywhere from 25 percent to 33 percent of the 
total payout, depending on when and how the litigation ends.”). 
 22.   There are two other related concerns.  One is that outside counsel may push the plaintiffs to 
accept an early settlement offer instead of holding out for a higher offer.  See, e.g., Paul Harzen Beach, 
The Parens Patriae Settlement Auction, 52 GONZ. L. REV. 455, 473 (2017) (“[Outside] counsel has an 
incentive to settle early, even if that settlement will be inadequate.  While a greater settlement will 
lead to greater total fees for counsel, [they] can maximize their return on investment by settling 
early.”).  A second concern is that outside counsel’s interest in ensuring they get paid may motivate 
them to accept a settlement that allows information about the industry’s misconduct to stay secret, 
contrary to the public’s interest.  See Barry Meier, Opioid Makers Are the Big Winners in Lawsuit 
Settlements, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/opinion/opioids-
lawsuits-purdue-pharma.html [https://perma.cc/YAS6-ZTDD] (“[I]n taking the industry’s money 
quickly, the public will lose its last opportunities to find out about the reckless ways that makers and 
distributors of opioids acted in pursuit of profit.”). 
 23.   Carr, supra note 10.  For further discussion of potential legal obstacles (and possible 
counter-arguments), see Rebecca L. Haffajee & Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for 
the Opioid Epidemic, 377 N. ENG. J. MED. 2301 (2017), https://www.nejm.org/doi/10.1056/ 
NEJMp1710756 [https://perma.cc/QPD2-A2CG]. 
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defendants’ confidence in their potential legal defenses may help explain 
why, despite pressure from the judge overseeing the opioid multi-district 
litigation (MDL), there has been no settlement to date.  The weight of the 
pressure may, of course, change if, as happened in the tobacco litigation, 
more internal documents emerge detailing the industry’s misconduct or 
collusion. 
An additional complication is that, unlike the state suits that led to the 
MSA, the opioid litigation now involves more than 1500 other municipal 
jurisdictions—and includes cases in both state and federal court.  The 
decisions of some local governments to file their own suits were a direct 
response to being left out of the tobacco settlement.  For example, the 
mayor of Missoula, Montana explained his decision to file a lawsuit on 
behalf of the city by saying, “Tobacco settlement money went to the State 
of Montana and was not proportionally allocated to communities based on 
local costs and impact . . . . We believe that by joining plaintiffs through 
class action as a municipality, we stand to see direct benefit of 
settlement.”24  Needless to say, reaching a settlement with so many more 
players will be considerably more difficult—and it is not clear that the 
defendants even have the assets to cover a settlement that will be 
acceptable to so many different plaintiffs.25 
Nonetheless, most commentators still believe that a massive 
settlement of some sort is likely in the opioid litigation (though it may not 
occur until after “bellwether” trials are concluded).  As the opioid cases 
move in that direction, it is important to review how the settlement 
proceeds from the MSA were spent and how public health advocates might 
try to ensure that more of the proceeds from an opioid settlement are 
committed to alleviating the effects of the current epidemic and preventing 
the next one. 
II. THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
In November 1998, the major cigarette manufacturers signed the 
                                                          
 24.   Editorial, Missoula’s Fight Against the Opioid Epidemic, MISSOULIAN (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://missoulian.com/opinion/editorial/missoula-s-fight-against-the-opioid-epidemic/article_2a45 
97c6-227a-595d-86bd-0ebe2f414a55.html [https://perma.cc/8GJF-JL43].  As Elizabeth Weeks has 
detailed, however, it may be very difficult for local governments to quantify the harms they have 
suffered as a result of the defendants’ misconduct.  See generally Weeks, supra note 17. 
 25.   See Terry, supra note 18, at 656–57 (“United States prescription opioid revenue peaked in 
2015 at $8 billion” while costs attributed to the opioid crisis were estimated to exceed $500 billion for 
that same year).  Connecticut Attorney General George Jepson has remarked that “‘talk of the tobacco 
settlement raises expectations [for the scope of an opioid settlement] in a way that are probably 
unfortunate.’”  Demko, supra note 6. 
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MSA—still the largest civil litigation settlement in history—in order to 
settle litigation brought by the attorneys general of forty-six states.26  
Under the agreement, the cigarette manufacturers agreed to pay the states 
more than $206 billion over twenty-five years.27  In return, the states gave 
up their legal claims against the cigarette manufacturers, including the 
right to sue the industry for smoking-related costs in the future.  Among 
other provisions, the MSA prohibited targeting of underage persons in 
tobacco advertising, banned the use of cartoons in cigarette advertising, 
and sharply restricted brand name sponsorship and outdoor advertising.28 
At the time, it was clear that one core purpose of the agreement was 
to provide states with funding for tobacco control programs.29  The MSA 
itself stated that the “the undersigned Settling State officials believe that 
entry into this Agreement . . . with the tobacco industry is necessary in 
order to further the Settling States’ policies designed to reduce Youth 
smoking [and] to promote the public health” and that the agreement would 
“achieve for the Settling States and their citizens significant funding for 
the advancement of public health.”30  These statements, however, were in 
the recitals or “whereas” clauses of the agreement; the operative 
provisions of the MSA did not contain any binding provisions that required 
the states to use the funds—or any portion thereof—to fund tobacco 
prevention and cessation. 
Using some (or even a large) portion of the settlement funds for 
unrelated purposes could be justified under the theory that the lawsuits 
provided for the recovery of funds that had already been spent on treating 
tobacco-related illnesses and that, in the absence of the industry’s 
                                                          
 26.   MSA, supra note 2.  The four other states—Florida, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas—
had previously reached their own separate settlement agreements that roughly paralleled the MSA.  
The District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands were also signatories to the MSA. 
 27.   MSA, supra note 2, at 28.  Though the twenty-five-year mark has been widely used to 
estimate the scope of the payout, the MSA payments go on in perpetuity, though the amount of future 
payments is tied to the volume of cigarette sales.  The MSA also funded the creation of the American 
Legacy Foundation, discussed in Part II.D, infra. 
 28.   See id. at 10.  Despite these limitations, tobacco industry spending on marketing actually 
increased following the MSA.  Walter J. Jones & Gerard Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement 
and its Impact on Tobacco Use 10 Years Later, 137 CHEST 692, 695 (2010); Carr, supra note 10.  Any 
global settlement agreement with opioid-related companies is also likely to include conduct 
restrictions.  That part of a potential settlement is not discussed in this article, but the MSA experience 
highlights to need to design such conduct restrictions carefully. 
 29.   See Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 3; Stephen A. Schroeder, Tobacco Control 
in the Wake of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, 350 N. ENG. J. MED. 293, 295 (2004) 
(“According to [former Senator John] McCain, at the time of the settlement there was general 
agreement that the money would be used ‘for tobacco education and treatment of smoking-related 
illnesses.’”). 
 30.   MSA, supra note 2, at 2.  
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misconduct, could have been spent on other purposes.31  However, the 
MSA also barred the states from seeking any cost recovery from the 
tobacco industry in the future.  Thus, if states did not spend some portion 
of the settlement proceeds on tobacco prevention and cessation, they could 
continue to incur the same smoking-related costs, without the ability to 
seek any further legal recourse.  So the expressed intention of nearly every 
attorney general involved in the settlement, at least according to their 
public statements, was that even if some of the settlement money was spent 
on other purposes, a significant portion of the funding would be set aside 
to reduce tobacco use and deal with the attendant public health problems.32 
But, as stated, this was not a condition of the agreement.  And without 
any requirement that state legislatures use the funds for tobacco-related 
purposes, for the most part they have not.33  In addition to health care, 
states almost immediately began spending their MSA proceeds to fund 
education, social services, infrastructure, tax cuts, rainy-day funds, and 
more.34  The latest report by the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids found 
that in 2017, “[S]tates will collect a record $27.5 billion in revenue from 
the tobacco settlement and tobacco taxes[, but] will spend only 2.6 percent 
of it—$721.6 million—on programs to prevent kids from smoking and 
help smokers quit.”35 
Moreover, a number of states have partially or fully securitized their 
ability to receive future settlement payments.  That is, they sold the rights 
to receive future MSA payments to investors in return for a large lump-
sum payment.  For example, in 2002, Rhode Island “approved a plan to 
sell, or securitize, the state’s rights to $1.19 billion in future tobacco 
settlement payments, for a smaller, one-time payment of $600 million.”36  
                                                          
 31.   See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-851, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES’ USE 
OF MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 26 (June 2001) (“Because claims for compensation 
for past health care costs, including Medicaid, were the basis for many of the initial lawsuits filed by 
the states, many states gave high priority to the use of MSA payments for health related funding and 
tobacco control programs.  Some states also told us that they viewed the settlement payments as an 
opportunity to fund needs that they were not able to fund previously due to the costs of health care.”).  
At least in the initial years following the MSA, states spent more MSA funds for health care costs than 
for any other purpose.  Id. at 32–34. 
 32.   Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 3. 
 33.   See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 31, at 37–41. 
 34.   Id.  
 35.   Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids et al., Broken Promises to Our Children: A State-by-State 
Look at the 1998 Tobacco Settlement 19 Years Later 1 (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/settlement/FY2018/
FY2018_state_settlement_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W27D-RAJC] [hereinafter Broken Promises 
2017]. 
 36.   Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids et al., Broken Promises to Our Children: A State-by-State 
Look at the 1998 Tobacco Settlement Thirteen Years Later 79 (Nov. 30, 2011), 
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At least 18 and the District of Columbia have at least partially securitized 
their MSA payments.37  In those states, though the industry continues to 
make its required payments under the MSA, those funds are no longer 
available to use for tobacco prevention (or any other purpose); instead, 
when the state receives money from the MSA, it is immediately disbursed 
to bondholders.38 
The failure of states to invest—or to consistently invest39—in tobacco 
control has had immense public health consequences.  Although smoking 
rates have declined substantially since the MSA, “these declines began 
before the agreement and were likely influenced by contemporaneous 
tobacco prevention and control efforts.”40  It is not clear that the MSA 
changed the trajectory of the decline in smoking rates at all.41  Nor has the 
MSA changed the fact that “[v]ery large disparities in tobacco use remain 
across racial/ethnic groups and between groups defined by educational 
level, socioeconomic status, and region.”42  Driving smoking rates down 
more precipitously and addressing these persistent smoking-related 
disparities would require “[s]tate capacity and infrastructure, including 
clear leadership and dedicated resources.”43  The MSA was almost 
certainly a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to build such an infrastructure.44 
The following sub-sections discuss various state-based efforts to try 
to ensure that MSA proceeds were used for tobacco control, with the 
experience of Ohio detailed in some depth as a paradigmatic example.  
                                                          
https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/content/what_we_do/state_local_issues/settlement/FY2012/2
011Broken_Promise_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7AR-W24Q] [hereinafter Broken Promises 
2011].  For a discussion of a variety of problems associated with MSA-backed bonds, see Cezary 
Podkul, How Wall Street Tobacco Deals Left States With Billions in Toxic Debt, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 
7, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-wall-street-tobacco-deals-left-states-
with-billions-in-toxic-debt [https://perma.cc/5S7Z-5N23].  
 37.   Jonathan H. Adler et. al., Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 
313, 354 (2016). 
 38.   Id. at 353–54. 
 39.   States did increase funding for tobacco control in the immediate aftermath of the MSA, but 
by 2003, they were spending only 3% of MSA funds on tobacco control.  Jones, supra note 28, at 695. 
 40.   Carr, supra note 10. 
 41.   Frank Sloan & Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the Public Welfare: Lessons 
from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 159, 184 (2011).  The authors also found 
no evidence that the MSA changed the trajectory of youth smoking rates, except through the MSA’s 
effect on cigarette prices.  Id. at 187.  
 42.   U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Office of the Surgeon 
General, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING—50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 17 (2014) 
https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/reports/50-years-of-progress/full-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZE9E-6CM2]. 
 43.   Id. at 812. 
 44.   I do not mean to understate the political difficulties that made it difficult to ensure that MSA 
funds were devoted to tobacco control over the long run—only to note the lost opportunity.   
2019 USING OPIOID SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 1039 
Though most of these efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, the experience 
of Florida provides one example of success.  The section concludes by 
discussing the American Legacy Foundation (later renamed the Truth 
Initiative), which is a national non-profit foundation set up by the MSA to 
implement tobacco prevention and cessation efforts. 
A. The Ohio Experience45 
Under the MSA, Ohio was scheduled to receive more than $10 billion 
between 2000 and 2026.  At the press conference announcing the 
settlement, then-Ohio Attorney General Betty Montgomery stated, “The 
reason we got in this fight was to protect public health and prevent 
underage smoking.  A significant portion of this money should go toward 
these causes.”46  Following the settlement, the governor and the Ohio 
legislature “created a bipartisan group of Ohio legislators and other public 
officials . . . for the purpose of making recommendations regarding the 
appropriate use of Ohio’s MSA payments.”47  The task force 
determined that good public policy required that at least a portion of the 
MSA moneys be permanently and irrevocably committed to the tobacco 
programs in a manner that would protect them from future efforts to 
redirect them to other agendas [and it therefore recommended] a 
sequestered trust fund outside the state treasury, like the state retirement 
system trusts, to protect it from legislative re-appropriation.48 
The Ohio General Assembly passed the legislation resulting from the 
task force’s recommendations in February 2000.  It passed with an 
overwhelming bipartisan majority in the House (87-9), and by narrower 
margin in the Senate, where Democrats objected that the plan did not 
reserve enough of the settlement money for public health purposes.49  The 
legislation created the Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Foundation 
(the “Foundation”), which was charged with developing and 
                                                          
 45.   The discussion of Ohio’s experience is informed, in part, by the author’s personal 
experiences.  From 2005 to 2008, Professor Berman directed the Ohio Tobacco Public Policy Center, 
which was funded by Ohio’s Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Foundation.  After Professor 
Berman left the Center, it closed when Ohio’s legislature dismantled the foundation. 
 46.   Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, supra note 3, at 5. 
 47.   Amicus Brief of Former Ohio Attorney General Betty D. Montgomery, Former Ohio Senate 
President Richard H. Finan, and Former Director of the Ohio Department of Health J. Nick Baird, 
M.D., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Bd. of Trs. of the Tobacco Use 
Prevention & Control Found., et al. v. Boyce,  941 N.E.2d 745 (2010) (No. 10-0118). 
 48.   Id.  
 49.   Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Taft Ready to Approve Tobacco Settlement Spending Plan, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 17, 2000). 
1040 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
implementing “a plan to reduce tobacco use by Ohioans, with emphasis on 
reducing the use of tobacco by youth, minority and regional populations, 
pregnant women, and others who may be disproportionately affected by 
the use of tobacco.”50  As recommended by the task force, the law provided 
that funds appropriated to the Foundation would “not be a part of the state 
treasury.”51  It also created a schedule of disbursements under which the 
Foundation would receive $1.26 billion through 2012, at which point it 
would be “self-sustaining” and would run in perpetuity off of its 
endowment.52 
In actuality, things did not run according to the task force’s (and 
General Assembly’s) plan.  The Foundation received the first scheduled 
payment from the MSA funds of approximately $330 million.53  But in 
future years, the subsequent scheduled payments were all diverted into 
either the state’s general fund or to various other programs.  In other 
words, the first payment made by the legislature to the Foundation was 
also the last.54  Each year, when it came time for the General Assembly to 
pass on a portion of the state’s MSA payments to the Foundation, it 
determined that the Foundation already had enough remaining in its 
coffers and the money could be better spent elsewhere.55 
Because of these diverted payments, the Foundation had to make the 
difficult decision to spend into its principal.  Nonetheless, once it got up 
and running, it carefully followed the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC’s) recommended best practices for tobacco control 
programs, and it showed impressive results.56  “From 2002 to 2008, Ohio’s 
adult smoking rate declined 24.4%, placing Ohio in the top quartile of 
states for the steepest declines during that time period.”57  Ohio’s high 
                                                          
 50.   Ohio Rev. Code § 183.07 (2000) (repealed 2008). 
 51.   Ohio Rev. Code § 183.08 (2000) (repealed 2008). 
 52.   Ohio Rev. Code § 183.02 (2000) (repealed 2008); Ohio Rev. Code § 183.08 (2000) (repealed 
2008).  The legislation also provided for smaller payments to seven other trust funds set up to address 
matters ranging from agricultural support to law enforcement improvements to educational initiatives.   
 53.   This was a combined payment for FY 2001 and FY 2002.  Gregory J. Tung & Stanton A. 
Glantz, Clean Air Now, But a Hazy Future: Tobacco Industry Political Influence and Tobacco Policy 
Making in Ohio 1997-2007, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. AND ED. 28 (May 2007), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/49n4q7qc [https://perma.cc/47WA-LKNN]. 
 54.   This is true with one minor exception.  In FY 2005, the Foundation received approximately 
$17 million in funds that had been diverted to other purposes but were unspent and therefore reverted 
back to the Foundation.  Id. at 30. 
 55.  Id. at 31. 
 56.  Despite the funding diversions, as of 2006, Ohio was spending more MSA money on tobacco 
control (nearly $48 million) than any other state.  Jones, supra note 28, at 694. 
 57.  HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE OF OHIO, The State of Tobacco Use Prevention and Cessation in 
Ohio, 7 (June 2015), https://www.healthpolicyohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PolicyBrief 
_Tobacco.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCD2-BAH3].  
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school smoking rates fell by 38% over the same period, and middle school 
smoking rates fell by 47%.58 
In 2007, the General Assembly securitized future settlement 
agreement payments, selling the rights to receive all future MSA payments 
in return for a large up-front payout.  That raised $5 billion, which was 
promptly spent as part of an economic stimulus package, mostly on tax 
cuts and school construction.59  “This action meant that all future MSA 
payments to Ohio were no longer available for tobacco prevention and 
control activities.”60  It also essentially eliminated the possibility that the 
Foundation would ever be reimbursed for the previous years’ payments 
that had been diverted to other purposes. 
The following year, things came to head when, in order to fund another 
economic stimulus package to jumpstart a still-flagging economy, the 
governor and the legislative leadership instructed the Foundation to turn 
over $230 million of the $270 million left in its endowment fund.61  Noting 
that the fund was, by statute “not a part of the state treasury,” and thus not 
subject to the legislature’s control, the Foundation refused.62  Instead, to 
protect the money from being diverted away from tobacco control efforts, 
the Foundation’s board quickly transferred $190 million to the American 
Legacy Foundation, with the understanding that the funds would be used 
to support tobacco prevention and cessation efforts in Ohio.63 
The governor and the General Assembly reacted swiftly, seeking to 
block the transfer of the $190 million by dismantling the Foundation in its 
entirety.64  The legislation to abolish the Foundation passed with 
overwhelming bipartisan margins in both the House (85-10) and the 
Senate (29-3).65  The legislature made a small appropriation to the Ohio 
Department of Health, which was put in charge of tobacco control efforts, 
                                                          
 58.   OHIO TOBACCO RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER, OHIO TOBACCO KEY INDICATORS 
REPORT 39 (Sept. 2007). 
 59.   Strickland’s Plans, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 6, 2008, at B5. 
 60.   HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE OF OHIO, supra note 57, at 7. 
 61.   Jim Provance, Strickland Loses Fight Over $200 Million in Tobacco Settlement Money, 
TOLEDO BLADE (Feb. 10, 2009, 10:36 AM), https://www.toledoblade.com/news/state/2009/ 
02/10/Strickland-loses-fight-over-200-million-in-tobacco-settlement-money/stories/200902100012 
[https://perma.cc/7MGS-DGHF]. 
 62.   Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. Bd. of Trs. v. Boyce, 941 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ohio 
2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
 63.   Id. 
 64.   Id. 
 65.   Abolishment of Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Foundation, 2008 Ohio Laws File 72; 
Ohio General Assembly Archives, Unofficial Votes for House Bill 544, 
http://archives.legislature.state.oh.us/votes.cfm?ID=127_HB_544 [https://perma.cc/2WLH-HL7G] 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
1042 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
but virtually overnight, Ohio went from having one of the best-funded 
tobacco control programs to one of the worst-funded.66 
In sum, the 2000 Ohio General Assembly made clear, in a bipartisan 
manner, its intent to establish a long-term plan to adequately fund tobacco 
control efforts in Ohio and to protect such funds from re-appropriation by 
future legislatures.  But this unmistakable intent—and the structure the 
General Assembly created—was insufficient to ensure that future General 
Assemblies would follow through with implementing this plan.  Despite 
the unmistakable success of the Foundation, funds designated for tobacco 
control were diverted, securitized, and ultimately reclaimed by future 
legislatures.  Only eight years after setting up its plan for allocating MSA 
payments (with most “no” votes complaining that not enough was being 
spent on tobacco prevention), the same legislative body voted 
overwhelmingly to dismantle the Foundation.67 
B. Other State Examples 
The Ohio experience is emblematic of what happened in a number of 
other states.  Following through on the intent expressed in the MSA, state 
attorneys general worked with their legislatures to make sure that some 
portion of the MSA money was set aside for tobacco control.  But these 
attempts to set aside money for public health proved to be short-lived.  
Ultimately, in nearly every state, the plan to make long-term, sustained 
investments in tobacco control was not realized and successful tobacco 
control programs were dismantled—often as the result of budgetary 
pressures.  To briefly summarize a few examples: 
North Dakota: Initially, North Dakota only allocated a limited 
amount of its MSA settlement proceeds to tobacco control.68  In 2007, 
tobacco control advocates gathered signatures to place an initiated statute 
on the ballot that would dedicate a portion of the MSA funds to tobacco 
                                                          
 66.   The fight over the Foundation’s money went on in the courts for an additional two years.  
The Ohio Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the contract with the American Legacy Foundation was 
invalid because the Foundation’s board had violated Ohio’s open meetings law and that the legislature 
acted within its authority in abolishing the Foundation.  Boyce, 941 N.E.2d at 753. 
 67.   Predictably, Ohio’s smoking rate stopped falling—and actually began to rise—after the 
foundation was eliminated, though changes in CDC survey methodology implemented in 2011 make 
it difficult to directly compare smoking rates over time.  HEALTH POLICY INSTITUTE OF OHIO, supra 
note 57, at 2. 
 68.   Jennifer R. Welle, Jennifer K. Ibrahim & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Control Policy Making 
in North Dakota: A Tradition of Activism, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. & EDUC. 4 (June 
1, 2004), https://escholarship.org/content/qt9v58x8ps/qt9v58x8ps.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTX4-
YHBH].  
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prevention and cessation.69  In 2008, the ballot issue passed by a 54%-46% 
margin, mandating that the state set aside sufficient MSA funds to 
implement a tobacco control program consistent with CDC best 
practices.70  As a result, North Dakota became one of the few states to fund 
tobacco control at or near CDC-recommended levels and “[f]rom 2009 to 
2015, smoking among North Dakota’s high school students fell by 48 
percent, from 22.4 percent to 11.7 percent.”71  As in Ohio, however, the 
success of the program was not sufficient to protect it in the long term.  In 
2017, when the state faced a budget shortfall, the BreatheND program that 
had been established as the result of the ballot measure was eliminated, 
and the budget for tobacco control was cut by nearly 50%.72  Notably, 
because the 2008 ballot issue had been passed as an initiated statute rather 
than as a constitutional amendment, the funding system it established 
could be undone by legislative enactment and this action did not require 
approval by the voters. 
Massachusetts: When the MSA was signed, Massachusetts already 
had a successful comprehensive tobacco control program in place, funded 
by the state’s cigarette tax.73  Following the MSA, the legislature passed a 
law creating a “Tobacco Settlement Fund” that would receive 50% of 
MSA proceeds for three years, and 30% of MSA proceeds in every year 
thereafter.74  The fund was to be used for “funding health related services 
and programs including, but not limited to, services and programs intended 
to control or reduce the use of tobacco.”75 
With the influx of MSA funds, the budget for the state’s tobacco 
control program rose to $54 million in 2000—and, as in other states, had 
the intended effect of sharply reducing adult and youth tobacco use.76  But 
the surge in tobacco control funding was short lived as “the onset of state 
and national budget crises precipitated severe cutbacks in FY 2002.”77  
                                                          
 69.   See BallotPedia, North Dakota Tobacco Use Prevention and Control Program Initiative, 
Measure 3 (2008), https://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Tobacco_Use_Prevention_and_Control_ 
Program_Initiative,_Measure_3_(2008) [https://perma.cc/6HG4-URD2] (last viewed Apr. 3, 2019).   
 70.   Id.  
 71.   Broken Promises 2017, supra note 35, at 7. 
 72.   Id.; Kaley Schwab, BreatheND Closes as Department of Health Takes Over Tobacco 
Prevention, KXNET.COM, (June 16, 2017, 6:02 PM), https://www.kxnet.com/news/bismarck-
news/breathend-closes-as-department-of-health-takes-over-tobacco-prevention/743696054 
[https://perma.cc/2FJQ-8SCZ].   
 73.   Howard K. Koh, et al., The First Decade of the Massachusetts Tobacco Control Program, 
120 PUB. HEALTH REP. 482, 490 (2005).   
 74.   MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 29, § 2XX (2001) (repealed 2003). 
 75.   Id. at (b). 
 76.   Koh, supra note 73, at 491. 
 77.   Id. 
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Governor Jane Swift used emergency powers to unilaterally cut the 
tobacco control program’s budget by $22 million.  This decision was 
challenged in court by the American Cancer Society, which argued that 
the governor’s emergency powers did not extend to the Tobacco 
Settlement Fund because the fund’s use had been restricted to a specific 
purpose by the legislature.78  The state’s highest court, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, ultimately ruled in favor of the governor, and 
“[t]his decision opened the door for a series of further cuts, ultimately 
leading to the nearly complete defunding of the [Massachusetts Tobacco 
Control Program].”79 
Mississippi: Mississippi was one of the four states that concluded its 
own settlement agreement with the cigarette companies prior to the MSA.  
Under that agreement, in addition to the annual payments made directly to 
the State of Mississippi, the cigarette companies were to pay $61.8 million 
directly to a pilot program “aimed specifically at the reduction of the use 
of Tobacco Products by children under the age of 18 years.”80  The 
Partnership for a Heathy Mississippi (“Partnership”) was set up as a 
private, non-profit entity to receive this $61.8 payment and operate the 
pilot program.81  With this funding, the Partnership implemented a highly 
successful youth prevention program.  Between 1999 and 2001, the 
number of public middle school students reporting current tobacco use fell 
by 26.7%, and the high school smoking rate also fell by about a third.82 
In 2000, at the request of the state’s attorney general, the court 
overseeing the settlement agreement ordered that $20 million of the 
settlement payments should be directed to the Partnership each year, rather 
than to the state, to continue its tobacco prevention work.83  The state (led 
by Governor and former Philip Morris lobbyist Haley Barbour) 
intervened, asserting that the Attorney General could not unilaterally 
modify the settlement agreement and that the state was entitled to receive 
the full amount of the annual payments.84  In 2007, the Mississippi 
                                                          
 78.   Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants, New England Div. of the Am. Cancer Soc’y v. Sullivan, 769 
N.E.2d 1248 (Mass. 2002) (No. SJC-08765), 2002 WL 33773710, at 28.   
 79.   Koh, supra note 73, at 491. 
 80.   Hood ex rel. State Tobacco Litig. v. State, 958 So. 2d 790, 795 (Miss. 2007). 
 81.   Id. 
 82.   Michael S. Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, Political Reform and Tobacco Control Policy 
Making in Mississippi From 1990 to 2001, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. AND ED. 4 (Mar. 
1, 2002), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/12x7g2h9 [https://perma.cc/3DXL-8YTY]; Emily 
McClelland, Nell Valentine & Robert McMillen, Tobacco Use Trends among Mississippi Youth 
Following the 1997 Settlement of Mississippi’s Medicaid Lawsuit and Subsequent Tobacco Prevention 
Initiatives, 56 J. MISS. ST. MED. ASS’N 328, 330 (2015).   
 83.   See Hood, 958 So. 2d at 792–93. 
 84.   Id. at 793. 
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Supreme Court ruled that there had been no properly executed 
modification to the settlement agreement and therefore the ongoing 
payments to the Partnership were improper.  In addition to halting future 
payments, it ordered the Partnership to return to the state all payments it 
had received since 2000.85  Though the state continued to support some 
tobacco prevention programming operated through the Department of 
Health, spending fell off precipitously.86  Mississippi now spends less than 
25% of the CDC-recommended amount on tobacco control programming 
($8.4 million in FY2018).87 
Mississippi provides an interesting case study in “what might have 
been.”  The creation of a private foundation (wholly outside state 
government) that was the direct recipient of settlement proceeds was a 
promising model, and proved to be successful in the short term.  But 
because the settlement agreement only funded the Partnership for two 
years, with future payments dependent on the state legislature, its 
programming was not sustained.  Whether a longer-term plan to fund the 
Partnership would have survived the inevitable legal and political attacks 
is unknown. 
Other States: Similar stories could be told about numerous other 
states, including Washington,88 Indiana,89 Illinois,90 Hawaii,91 and 
Minnesota.92  Among those states that initially invested a significant 
                                                          
 85.   Id. at 815–16. 
 86.   Broken Promises 2017, supra note 35. 
 87.   Id. 
 88.   Id. at 8 (“Washington state, which had a well-funded prevention program before funding 
was virtually eliminated in FY2012, reduced adult smoking by one-third and youth smoking by half 
from the initiation of its program in 1999 to 2010.”). 
 89.   Stephen J. Jay, Mohammad R. Torabi & Miranda H. Spitznagle, A Decade of Sustaining 
Best Practices for Tobacco Control: Indiana’s Story, 9 PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE E3 (2002) 
(detailing how the independent state agency created in the wake of the MSA operated from 2000 until 
2011 and was then dismantled by the legislature). 
 90.   Randy Uang, Richard Barnes & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Policymaking in Illinois, 1965-
2014: Gaining Ground in a Short Time, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. AND EDU. 282 
(May 1, 2014), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6805h95r [https://perma.cc/T5YZ-DDA7] (“The state 
tobacco control budget underwent a period of high appropriations in the early 2000s only to fall 
precipitously and remained at a lower level throughout the mid- and late 2000s and early 2010s.”). 
 91.   Richard L. Barnes, Jennifer R. McCarthy & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Control in Hawai’i: 
Progress in Paradise, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. & EDU. 4 (July 14, 2008), 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6696s2c8 [https://perma.cc/88ET-WGRQ]  (“Heavy lobbying by the 
University of Hawai’i to raid the MSA funds to build medical school facilities robbed tobacco control 
programs of vital resources.  The 25% of the MSA funds that goes to the Department of Health is to 
be spent for a variety of health promotion and disease prevention programs, but the Department 
allocates relatively little to tobacco control.”).  
 92.   David F. Sly et al., The Outcome Consequences of Defunding the Minnesota Youth Tobacco-
Use Prevention Program, 41 PREVENTATIVE MED. 503, 504 (2005) (describing how Minnesota’s 
youth-focused public education campaign was launched with MSA funds in 2000 but eliminated by 
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portion of MSA proceeds (and many did not even do that), those 
investments were not sustained over the long term.  Despite strong 
evidence that these programs were successfully reducing tobacco use—
which, over time, saves states money93—the urge to redirect the MSA 
funds proved irresistible to governors and state legislatures, especially 
when the states’ economies inevitably hit hard times.  In-fighting among 
health-related groups also contributed to the declines in funding.  In 
several cases, tobacco prevention funds were diverted to other health-
related purposes, such as building new cancer centers,94 reflecting the 
long-standing difficulty in adequately funding public health and 
prevention when medical care provides much more immediate and 
tangible results (and political payoff).95  The behind-the-scenes role of the 
tobacco industry in discouraging investments in tobacco control was also 
a factor in at least some cases.96 
Importantly, the structural mechanism used to try to ensure that 
tobacco control funds would be sustainable did not appear to matter.  
Setting up a foundation with funds that were “not a part of the state 
treasury”97 did not provide adequate protection, since a foundation that had 
been created by the legislature could also be dismantled later on by the 
same legislature.  Legal challenges pointing out that MSA funds had 
already been dedicated to a particular purpose were unsuccessful; what 
one legislature and governor had committed to, a later governor and 
                                                          
the legislature in 2003). 
 93.   Julia A. Dilley et al., Program, Policy, and Price Interventions for Tobacco Control: 
Quantifying the Return on Investment of a State Tobacco Control Program, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
e22, e27 (2012) (finding that over 10 years, the return on investment for Washington State’s tobacco 
program was more than $5 for each $1 spent); James Lightwood & Stanton A. Glantz, The Effect of 
the California Tobacco Control Program on Smoking Prevalence, Cigarette Consumption, and 
Healthcare Costs: 1989-2008, 8 PLOS ONE 1 (2013) (“Between FY 1989 and 2008 the California 
Tobacco Program cost $2.4 billion and led to cumulative NIPA healthcare expenditure savings of $134 
(SE $30.5) billion.”). 
 94.   See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 91, at 4. 
 95.   J. Michael McGinnis, Pamela Williams-Russo & James R. Knickman, The Case for More 
Active Policy Attention to Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH AFF. 78, 78 (2002) (“Approximately 95 
percent of the trillion dollars we spend as a nation on health goes to direct medical care services, while 
just 5 percent is allocated to population wide approaches to health improvement.  However, some 40 
percent of deaths are caused by behavior patterns that could be modified by preventive 
interventions.”).  In the tobacco context specifically, underfunding may partially be due to 
longstanding stigma against smokers, who are blamed for their own addiction.   
 96.   See, e.g., Jones, supra note 28, at 696 (discussing the example of Texas).  Though this may 
be less of an issue in the opioid context, it is certainly possible that pharmaceutical companies would 
push states to spend settlement money in the health care sector, rather than on public health and 
prevention.   
 97.   Tobacco Use Prevention & Control Found. Bd. of Trs. v. Boyce, 941 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ohio 
2010) (internal quotations omitted). 
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legislature (or, in the case of Massachusetts, just the governor) could undo.  
Even in the case of North Dakota, where the state’s citizens voted by a 
clear margin to dedicate funds to tobacco control, the legislature was 
willing to dismantle the state’s successful program less than a decade later. 
C. The Florida Exception 
There is, however, one exception to the rule that all state efforts to set 
aside a significant portion of settlement funds for tobacco control have 
failed.  That exception is the case of Florida, where a voter-initiated 
constitutional amendment has, since 2006, provided significant funding 
for the state’s youth tobacco prevention program.98 
Florida’s story started out like that of most other states.  A substantial 
portion of settlement funds was used for tobacco control in 1998 and 1999, 
and the program quickly demonstrated success in reducing youth smoking 
rates.99  “Smoking prevalence among middle school students dropped by 
40% and among high school students by 18% during the program’s first 2 
years.”100  Starting in 1999, however, the legislature and governor made 
deeper and deeper cuts to the program.  By “fiscal year 2004, the program 
was essentially eliminated, with a budget slashed to $1 million.”101  
Predictably, as the state cut funds for the program, the decline in youth 
smoking rates slowed considerably.102 
                                                          
 98.   Florida was one of the four states that settled with the tobacco industry prior to the MSA.  
That difference is immaterial to the issue of the allocation of settlement funds discussed here.  Shortly 
after the MSA, four other states (Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, and Utah) passed legislatively-
initiated constitutional amendments to govern the use of some or all MSA proceeds.  GENERAL 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 31, at 21.  Unlike the Florida case, though, these were not designed 
to fully fund an effective tobacco control program.  Of these, the Oklahoma constitutional amendment 
has been most successful in ensuring that at least some MSA funds are used to support tobacco control 
programs.  See Andrew Spivak & Michael S. Givel, From Industry Dominance to Legislative 
Progress: The Political and Public Health Struggle of Tobacco Control in Oklahoma, U. OF OKLA. 
DEP’T OF POL. SCI. 8 (July 1, 2005), https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/ 
qt65d3s7qb/qt65d3s7qb.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAX4-KDZA] (explaining that voters approved the 
creation of a “constitutionally protected Tobacco Settlement Endowment Trust Fund” in 2000, “but 
funding for tobacco control programs from the trust fund has been slow due to the requirement to 
spend only the interest and dividends and not the [principal]”).  
 99.   Michael S. Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, Failure to Defend a Successful State Tobacco 
Control Program: Policy Lessons from Florida, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 762, 762 (2000).  
 100.   Allison Kennedy et al., Strong Tobacco Control Program Requirements and Secure 
Funding Are Not Enough: Lessons from Florida, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 807, 807 (2012). 
 101.   Id. 
 102.   FLA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, Florida Youth Tobacco Survey (FYTS), 
http://www.floridahealth.gov/statistics-and-data/survey-data/florida-youth-survey/florida-youth-
tobacco-survey/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZLA6-FHMN] (last modified Feb. 8, 2019, 2:35 PM).  
For a visual representation of this data, see Tobacco Free Partnership of Levy County, Teen Smoking 
Rates at All-Time Low (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.tfp-levy.org/news_archives/20150923_news.html 
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But unlike in other states, public health groups tried a new strategy in 
response.  In 2006, the American Cancer Society, the American Lung 
Association, the American Heart Association, and the Campaign for 
Tobacco-Free Kids collectively spent more than $5 million to place a 
constitutional amendment on the statewide ballot.103  The amendment 
required the state to allocate approximately $57 million (“15% of 2005 
Tobacco Settlement payments to Florida”), adjusted annually for inflation, 
“for a comprehensive statewide tobacco education and prevention 
program using Centers for Disease Control best practices.”104  The 
amendment passed with more than 60% of the vote.105 
Since 2007, the Tobacco-Free Florida program (which is part of the 
state’s health department) has been funded through this constitutional 
amendment, and the results have been impressive.  Florida now boasts one 
of the lowest youth smoking rates in the country, at 3.6%, less than half 
the national average of 8.1%.106  The adult smoking rate has declined as 
well, though not as precipitously.107  Tobacco-Free Florida claims that 
since 2007, “[t]here are now approximately 451,000 fewer adult smokers 
in Florida . . . and the state has saved $17.7 billion in health care costs.”108 
Florida’s success has not been unqualified.  Strong funding for a 
tobacco control program is no guarantee of high quality and effective 
leadership, and tobacco control advocates have, at times, criticized 
                                                          
[https://perma.cc/YSH5-N8QL]. 
 103.   Kennedy, supra note 100, at 807.  
 104.   BallotPedia, Florida Amendment 4, Use of Tobacco Settlement Funds (2006), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_4,_Use_of_Tobacco_Settlement_Funds_(2006) 
[https://perma.cc/AYB3-B2NQ] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).  
 105.   Id.  Interestingly, there does not appear to have been any organized opposition to this ballot 
measure. 
 106.   Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Key State Specific Tobacco-Related Data & Rankings 1 
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0176.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
LWN3-7MH8].  Comparisons between states are not precise, because of different surveys used to 
calculate youth smoking rates.  Similarly, it is difficult to compare reductions in rates over time 
because of different surveys and methodologies used, but it appears likely that since 2007 youth 
smoking rates have declined more rapidly in Florida than in most other states.  For instance, the Florida 
Youth Tobacco Survey reported a 71% decline in high school smoking from 2007 to 2017 (14.5% to 
4.2%), while the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) reported a national decline of 
56% (20% to 8.8%) over that same period.  Id. 
 107.   Christine Sexton, Tobacco Funding Fight Extinguished In Florida CRC, 
NEWSDAYTONABEACH.COM (Mar. 23, 2018), http://www.newsdaytonabeach.com/news-service-of-
florida/tobacco-funding-fight-extinguished-in-florida-constitution-revision-commission/ 
[https://perma.cc/9DQG-8MYQ] (“According to the Florida Department of Health . . . [i]n 2006, the 
adult smoking rate was 21 percent, and in 2015 it was 15.8 percent, the lowest it has ever been.”). 
 108.   Bureau of Tobacco Free Florida, Bureau of Tobacco Free Florida’s Statement Regarding 
Youth Electronic Cigarette Use (Dec. 20, 2018), http://tobaccofreeflorida.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Bureau-of-Tobacco-Free-Florida-Statement-Regarding-Youth-Electronic-
Cigarette-Use.pdf [https://perma.cc/893C-3RBP]. 
2019 USING OPIOID SETTLEMENT PROCEEDS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH 1049 
Florida’s program for devoting funds to “low-impact tobacco control 
strategies.”109  Additionally, even though the amendment guarantees 
funding for tobacco control programming, the legislature has nonetheless 
tried to divert a significant amount of the funding to biomedical research 
and medical schools.110  These efforts have, for the most part, been 
defeated, but protecting the tobacco control programs requires constant 
vigilance from public health groups.111 
Though the governor and the legislature still have the ability to 
influence Tobacco-Free Florida’s direction, they are bound by the 
amendment to provide it with adequate funding to run an effective tobacco 
control program.112  And Tobacco-Free Florida is, in turn, required by the 
Amendment to follow CDC’s best practices.  And because these 
requirements are now written into the state constitution, overturning them 
would require a vote of more than 60% of the electorate.113  This has 
proven to be the most stable way of adequately funding a tobacco control 
program. 
Florida is the only example of a state using a constitutional 
amendment to ensure that settlement proceeds are spent on tobacco 
control, but several other states have pursued constitutional amendments 
to increase tobacco taxes and devote a portion of the proceeds to reducing 
tobacco use.114  These efforts have failed more often than they have 
succeeded, but the potential of this approach was demonstrated in 2016, 
when California voters approved a constitutional amendment increasing 
the state’s tobacco tax by $2 per pack and devoting 13% of the resulting 
revenue (estimated at more than $200 million per year) to tobacco 
prevention and cessation.115  As with the MSA proceeds, constitutional 
amendments provide the best hope for ensuring that tax revenues are 
directed to tobacco control efforts; where tax revenue has been dedicated 
to public health through initiated statutes, such funding has proven to be 
                                                          
 109.   Kennedy, supra note 100, at 807.   
 110.   Allison Kennedy et al., Tobacco Control in Florida 1999-2011: The Good, The Bad, and 
the Ugly, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. & EDUC. 236 (Sept. 2011). 
 111.   Indeed, in 2018, the Florida Constitution Revision Commission (which meets once every 20 
years) discussed proposing a ballot issue to undue the amendment’s requirement.  Due to strong 
opposition from public health groups, the issue was not referred to the ballot.  Sexton, supra note 107. 
 112.   Importantly, that amount of funding is adjusted for inflation, so it remains sufficient for the 
program’s needs over time. 
 113.   Kennedy, supra note 100, at 101. 
 114.   K.L. Lum, R.L. Barnes & S.A. Glantz, Enacting Tobacco Taxes by Direct Popular Vote in 
the United States: Lessons from 20 Years of Experience, 18 TOBACCO CONTROL 377, 378 (2009) 
(noting failed constitutional amendments in Missouri and Oregon, but a successful one in Colorado).   
 115.   Broken Promises 2017, supra note 35, at 1. 
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unsustainable.116 
D. American Legacy Foundation/Truth Initiative 
As previously mentioned, not all of the MSA proceeds went to the 
states.  The agreement also provided for the establishment of a foundation 
to support “the study of and programs to reduce Youth Tobacco Product 
usage and . . . to prevent diseases associated with the use of Tobacco 
Products in the States.”117  Cigarette manufacturers were required to make 
payments totaling $1.7 billion to the foundation between 1995 and 2008.118  
These provisions resulted in the creation of the American Legacy 
Foundation, renamed the Truth Initiative in 2015.  Though the Truth 
Initiative no longer receives payments through the MSA, it has pursued a 
fiscal strategy to extend its life and impact.  As of 2018, it held more than 
$800 million in investments.119 
The Truth Initiative is engaged in four primary activities: 
(i) youth/young adult public education (primarily through the truth® 
anti-tobacco counter-marketing campaign), (ii) research policy and 
practice including . . . [the] Schroeder Institute for Tobacco Research 
and Policy Studies[,] (iii) community and youth engagement 
activities . . . and (iv) using innovative digital tools to design, build and 
market effective and scalable approaches to smoking cessation.120 
The Truth Initiative’s signature program is the award-winning truth® 
counter-marketing campaign, which “features fast-paced, hard-edged ads 
that present facts about the addictiveness of smoking, the number of deaths 
and amount of disease attributed to smoking, the ingredients in cigarettes, 
and the marketing practices of the tobacco industry.”121 
                                                          
 116.   See, e.g., Michael Siegel, The Effectiveness of State-Level Tobacco Control Interventions: 
A Review of Program Implementation and Behavioral Outcomes, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 45, 47–
49 (2002) (discussing diversion of tobacco tax funds allocated by ballot initiative in California and 
Massachusetts).   
 117.   MSA, supra note 2, at 41. 
 118.   MSA, supra note 2, at 42.  The payment amounts are subject to some adjustments based on 
inflation and the volume of tobacco sales.  Id. at 42–43. 
 119.   TRUTH INITIATIVE, Truth Initiative Foundation and Affiliate: Consolidated Financial 
Report 3 (June 30, 2018).  
 120.   Id. at 7. 
 121.   Jane A. Allen, et al., The truth® Campaign: Using Countermarketing to Reduce Youth 
Smoking, in THE NEW WORLD OF HEALTH PROMOTION: NEW PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 196 (Bernard J. Healey & Robert S. Zimmerman, Jr., eds) 
(2010).  Importantly, the truth® campaign has eschewed the discredited “just say no” approach to 
public health campaigns and has instead pioneered new methods that have been effective in 
influencing youth opinions and changing social norms surrounding smoking.  Id. 
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The Truth Initiative—and the truth® counter-marketing campaign, in 
particular—have arguably been the most significant and impactful element 
of the MSA.  A 2005 study found that between 1999 and 2002, “smoking 
prevalence among [middle- and high-school] students declined from 
25.3% to 18.0% . . . and that the [truth®] campaign accounted for 
approximately 22% of this decline.”122  A more recent study estimated that 
in the course of just one year, the truth® campaign prevented more than 
300,000 youth and young adults from smoking.123  In short, the $1.7 billion 
committed to the American Legacy Foundation/Truth Initiative has had a 
tremendous return on investment in terms of reducing youth smoking124—
perhaps as much or more than the over $150 billion that has already been 
paid to the states. 
As with any effective tobacco control program, the truth® campaign 
has come under attack and has required defending.  Most notably, Lorillard 
Tobacco Company sued the foundation in 2002, alleging that its hard-
hitting truth® advertisements violated the MSA’s “vilification clause,” 
which prohibits “any personal attack on, or vilification of” a tobacco 
company or executive.125  In 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the American Legacy Foundation,126 but the extensive legal battle 
“significantly burdened the Foundation, consuming financial and human 
resource that could have been otherwise spent on the public health mission 
of the organization.”127  Despite this and other challenges,128 directing 
settlement proceeds to a national non-profit foundation that is not 
beholden to (or subject to the changing preferences) any of state legislature 
has been the most secure way of ensuring that settlement funds are spent 
                                                          
 122.   Matthew C. Farrelly, et al., Evidence of a Dose–Response Relationship Between “truth” 
Antismoking Ads and Youth Smoking Prevalence, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 425, 425 (2005). This 
evaluation included authors from the American Legacy Foundation, and so was not fully independent.   
 123.   Donna Vallone et al., The Effect of Branding to Promote Healthy Behavior: Reducing 
Tobacco Use among Youth and Young Adults, 14 INT’L. J. ENV. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1517, 1517 
(2017).  Again, authors include Truth Initiative researchers. 
 124.   The truth® campaign may have provided a positive return on investment in terms of medical 
costs averted as well.  See David R. Holtgrave et al., Cost–Utility Analysis of the National truth ® 
Campaign to Prevent Youth Smoking, 36 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 385, 385, 387 (2009) (estimating 
that the 2000-2002 truth® campaign averted $1.9 billion in medical costs for society, while costing 
$324 million).  
 125.   MSA, supra note 2, at 47.  For a detailed review of this litigation, see J.K. Ibrahim & Stanton 
A. Glantz, Tobacco Industry Litigation Strategies to Oppose Tobacco Control Media Campaigns, 15 
TOBACCO CONTROL 50 (2006).  Technically, the American Legacy Foundation was the plaintiff in the 
suit, because in the face of repeated legal threats from Lorillard, it filed for a declaratory judgement 
that it was not in violation of the MSA.   
 126.   Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 732 (Del. 2006). 
 127.   Allen, supra note 121, at 205. 
 128.   For further discussion of the challenges the foundation has faced, see Cheryl G. Healton, M. 
Lyndon Haviland & Ellen Vargyas, Will the Master Settlement Agreement Achieve a Lasting Legacy?, 
5 HEALTH PROMOTION PRAC. 12S (2004). 
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on their intended purpose. 
III. LESSONS LEARNED FOR POTENTIAL OPIOID SETTLEMENTS 
Keeping in mind that the opioid litigation differs in significant ways 
from the tobacco litigation, what are the lessons from the use of MSA 
proceeds that could inform efforts to ensure that a substantial portion of 
future opioid settlement agreement funds are used to advance public 
health?  This can be broken down into two different questions: (1) could a 
future settlement directly, through its terms, ensure that settlement 
proceeds are used for public health purposes?, and, if not, (2) what can be 
done at the state or local level to ensure that settlement funds are applied 
to their intended purpose?  The experience of the MSA does not fully 
answer either one of these questions, but it provides some potential 
guidance. 
A. Direct Allocation for Public Health 
The experience of the MSA money being diverted away from use for 
tobacco prevention and cessation raises an obvious question: what if the 
MSA had mandated that the funds be used in a particular way, rather than 
merely placing aspirational language in the “whereas” clauses?  When 
asked about this, Joe Rice of Motley Rice LLC, who was lead counsel for 
about half of the states in the tobacco litigation—and is now co-lead 
counsel for the plaintiffs in the opioid MDL—said, “There was a wide 
range of views among the AGs [attorneys general] about how far they 
could go to specifically allocate funds for specific uses . . . . [Although 
some were supportive,] others felt it was a legislative function to 
appropriate all the money and did not support directing the funds.”129  He 
added that “[i]f we’d gone much further [in mandating that funds be used 
for tobacco control], we could have had a separation of powers 
disagreement and may have needed legislative approval of the 
settlement.”130  In other words, at least some of the attorneys general either 
did not think they had the legal authority to direct settlement funds to 
specific purposes,131 or did not think it was their appropriate role to do 
                                                          
 129.   Allison Torres Burtka, ‘98 Settlement Agreement, AM. MUSEUM OF TORT L., 
https://www.tortmuseum.org/98-tobacco-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/HG33-X66P] (last visited Apr. 
3, 2019).  
 130.   Id. 
 131.   Then-Connecticut Attorney General (and now U.S. Senator) Richard Blumenthal says that 
at the time “‘[t]he conclusion was that it would be unconstitutional,’” but he now wishes that this 
conclusion had been tested in court. Demko, supra note 6. 
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so.132 
Though an attorney general could not instruct a state legislature to 
spend state funds in a particular way, is it possible that a state’s attorney 
general could sign a settlement agreement directly allocating proceeds to 
a non-governmental entity—thereby evading legislative appropriation 
altogether?  Whether or not this would violate a state’s separation of 
powers doctrine would be a question of state constitutional law, and states 
may differ on the answer.  But somewhat surprisingly, there do not seem 
to be any cases squarely addressing this question.133  The closest example 
in the tobacco context is the example of Mississippi, discussed above, 
where the settlement agreement (which was separate from the MSA) 
called for a $61.8 million payment to be made directly to a private, non-
profit entity, the Partnership for a Healthy Mississippi, to support youth 
tobacco prevention programming.  This original allocation was not 
challenged—the later Hood litigation only involved subsequent payments 
made to the Foundation after the attorney general had purported to modify 
the settlement agreement.  In that litigation, the governor and legislature 
raised a separation of powers challenge to the payments, but the court did 
not reach that issue because it found that the settlement agreement had not 
been properly modified, and therefore the later payments were not 
authorized. 
One potential way to avoid (or at least mitigate) the separation of 
powers issue would be for a settlement to provide that in order for a state 
to receive settlement funds, it must pass legislation directing a set portion 
of the settlement funds to a non-profit foundation in its state that would 
use those funds for opioid-related prevention, treatment, and education.  In 
this way the state legislature would be directly authorizing the payment 
(though under some pressure), which would make a separation of powers 
challenge more difficult.  A somewhat similar mechanism was used in the 
MSA.  In order for states to receive the full amount of their promised 
payments under the MSA, they were required to pass legislation ensuring 
                                                          
 132.   Alternatively, it may have been that they were yielding to political pressure.  Former Maine 
Attorney General James Tierney recalls, “There was a lot of pressure from governors and 
legislators . . . . They really wanted the money.”  Id.  In later testimony before the U.S. Senate, a 
representative of the National Governors Association argued that “given the long history of state 
expenditures for smoking-related illnesses and the fiscal pressures facing the states, the financial 
flexibility provided to the states in the MSA is not only appropriate, but vitally necessary.”  State 
Spending of Tobacco Settlement Revenues: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 
108th Cong. 25 (2003) (statement of Raymond C. Scheppach).   
 133.   Even if one agrees with how such power is used in any given case, there could of course be 
policy objections to attorneys general having such broad authority to direct the spending of funds that 
are, in essence, being paid to the state.  
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that tobacco companies who were not parties to the agreement would be 
required to make “escrow” payments to the states that roughly paralleled 
the payments made by the defendants.134  This MSA provision has been 
criticized as unduly “collusive and coercive,” because it essentially forced 
state legislatures to protect the tobacco companies’ economic interests.135  
But the MSA’s approach has withstood numerous legal challenges,136 and 
it is arguably far more appropriate to use such a mechanism to ensure that 
some portion of settlement funds are set aside for their intended purpose. 
Whatever the mechanism, trying to follow and expand upon the 
Mississippi model and send settlement payments directly to non-
governmental, state-based foundations would, of course, be complicated, 
particularly in the context of a national settlement.137  But the legal and 
practical viability of such an approach deserves further scrutiny.  Such an 
approach could be a viable way of resolving the likely challenge that 
settlement proceeds will be inadequate to meet all of the 1500-plus 
plaintiffs’ needs and expectations.  Allocating proceeds to fifty state-based 
entities seems far more feasible than dividing funding among more than 
1500 localities, and state-based foundations (similar to the Partnership for 
a Healthy Mississippi) model could then act as grant-making entities 
responsible for making the difficult decisions about how to prioritize and 
allocate spending within the state.  Most critically, ensuring that some 
portion of the funds are never subject to legislative appropriation provides 
the best chance of ensuring that the money is not diverted (either 
immediately or later on) to other purposes. 
Along those lines, there do not seem to be any obvious legal barriers 
to following the MSA’s model and allocating a share of any resulting 
settlement to a national foundation like American Legacy 
                                                          
 134.   MSA, supra note 2, at 58–68.  For more detail on this provision, see generally Andrew J. 
Haile & Matthew W. Krueger-Andes, Landmark Settlements and Unintended Consequences, 44 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 145 (2012) 
 135.   Thomas C. O’Brien, Constitutional and Antitrust Violations of the Multistate Tobacco 
Settlement 3 (May 18, 2000), https://object.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa371.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW7F-
3RCV].  See also Haile, supra note 134, at 175 (“Whether or not this [MSA provision] constitutes a 
violation of the separation of powers requirement, it certainly amounts to an unprecedented abrogation 
of legislative power by the state and blurs the lines between the legislative and executive branches.”). 
 136.   See Bruce Yandle et. al., Bootleggers, Baptists & Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by 
Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1276–77 (2008). 
 137.   How protected such a foundation would be from political interference would also depend 
upon its structure and the specifics of state law.  See J.K. Ibrahim, T.H. Tsoukalas & S.A. Glantz, 
Public Health Foundations and the Tobacco Industry: Lessons from Minnesota, 13 TOBACCO 
CONTROL 228, 228 (2004) (discussing how the Minnesota Partnership for Action Against Tobacco, 
which was set up as a private foundation to spend MSA funds, was “insulat[ed] from traditional 
political attacks through the legislative process or executive branch, but left it vulnerable to attacks by 
the attorney general, who has responsibility for oversight of private foundations in most states”). 
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Foundation/Truth Initiative.  Given the Truth Initiative’s record of 
accomplishment—in contrast to the states’ diversion of settlement funds 
away from their intended purpose—a strong case could be made for 
allocating a significant share of any settlement to such a foundation.  
Indeed, Mike Moore has stated that he regrets the widescale diversion of 
tobacco settlement funds, and that “[t]his time, he wants a comprehensive, 
company-funded national program that would make treatment more 
widely available . . . as well as expand prevention education.”138  There are 
obvious political barriers to allocating money to a national foundation, 
rather than to the plaintiffs,139 but there may not be a more effective way 
of spending money to promote public health.  Requiring that some 
percentage of the foundation’s money is redirected to state-based or local 
prevention and treatment programs (again, perhaps, through a grant-
making process) could help reduce the sting of reducing the amount of 
settlement revenue paid directly to the plaintiff governmental entities.140 
B. Ensuring that State Settlement Proceeds are Spent on Public Health 
Assuming that settlement proceeds are sent directly to the plaintiffs, 
what can be done to ensure that legislatures or city councils spend the 
money (or a portion of it) to benefit public health?  The main lesson of the 
state experiences with tobacco settlement proceeds is clear: good 
intentions and even statutory promises to spend settlement dollars on 
public health are not sufficient.  When hard fiscal times inevitably arise, 
the pressures to reallocate the funds to short-term needs, or even to 
sacrifice future settlement payments for an immediate payout, prove too 
strong to resist.  This proved to be the case even where, as in Ohio, the 
legislature set up an endowed foundation to administer its tobacco control 
program,141 and in cases like North Dakota, where the voters expressly 
indicated their desire to adequately fund tobacco prevention efforts.  
Because a current legislature cannot make commitments on behalf of a 
future legislature, stronger measures are needed. 
The only approach so far that has succeeded in protecting tobacco 
                                                          
 138.   Esmé E. Deprez & Paul Barrett, The Lawyer Who Beat Big Tobacco Takes on the Opioid 
Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 5, 2017, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/features/2017-10-05/the-lawyer-who-beat-big-tobacco-takes-on-the-opioid-industry. 
 139.   The states and cities bringing these lawsuits would presumably prefer that they—rather than 
some national foundation—get to decide how the resulting proceeds are spent.  
 140.   And unlike the American Legacy Foundation, it would be preferable if such a foundation 
were funded (or endowed) in perpetuity.   
 141.   The foundation set up in Ohio was a government entity, which is a key difference with the 
non-governmental foundation established in Mississippi. 
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settlement funds from diversion is a state constitutional amendment, as 
was used in Florida (though the Florida example also suggests the need to 
remain active in protecting funding even after such an amendment is 
approved).  There are obvious reasons, though, why constitutional 
amendments have not been used more broadly to protect tobacco control 
funding.  For one, they are expensive.  The Florida campaign cost more 
than $5 million in 2006;142 the price tag would be much higher today.  The 
campaign for California’s 2016 amendment to raise the cigarette tax cost 
more than $35 million, and tobacco companies spent more than $70 
million to oppose it.143  Additionally, constitutional amendment elections 
are not easy to win, despite broad public support for using tobacco-related 
proceeds for public health.  In 2002, for example, an effort to allocate the 
bulk of Michigan’s MSA money to health care and tobacco prevention 
efforts was defeated by a 2-to-1 margin.144  More recently, the tobacco 
companies spent more than $17 million (which equated to more than $66 
per vote) in 2018 to defeat a tobacco tax increase in Montana.145 
In the opioid context, it is less clear what groups would bankroll an 
effort to ensure that litigation proceeds are used to address the epidemic—
and the many different parties involved (prevention groups, treatment 
groups, harm reduction groups, health care entities, insurers, law 
enforcement, etc.) may make it difficult to even come up with an agreed-
upon plan for how proceeds should be spent.146  At the same time, 
however, it is also less clear who the determined opposition would be.  
Unlike the tobacco companies, who have an ongoing interest in selling 
                                                          
 142.   BALLOTPEDIA, Florida Amendment 4, Use of Tobacco Settlement Funds (2006), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_4,_Use_of_Tobacco_Settlement_Funds_(2006) 
[https://perma.cc/L5WE-D3AR] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
 143.   BALLOTPEDIA, California Proposition 56, Tobacco Tax Increase (2016),  
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_56,_Tobacco_Tax_Increase_(2016) [https://perma.cc/ 
R6MS-N7ZG] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
 144.   Frank A. Sloan et al., States’ Allocations of Funds from the Tobacco Master Settlement 
Agreement, 24 HEALTH AFF. 220, 222 (2005). 
 145.   BALLOTPEDIA, Montana I-185, Extend Medicaid Expansion and Increase Tobacco Taxes 
Initiative (2018), https://ballotpedia.org/Montana_I-185,_Extend_Medicaid_Expansion_and_ 
Increase_Tobacco_Taxes_Initiative_(2018) [https://perma.cc/N6Z4-VBWZ] (last visited Apr. 3, 
2019).  This tax was proposed as an initiated statute, rather than as a constitutional amendment.  Id. 
 146.   For example, those involved in law enforcement may push for more money to be spent on 
law enforcement approaches, while public health advocates would prefer for money to be spent on 
prevention and treatment (and may view standard law enforcement approaches as counterproductive).  
In the tobacco context, the CDC has developed evidence-based best practices for state tobacco control 
programs, which have guided the most successful state programs and framed the approach pursued in 
ballot initiatives.  CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, BEST PRACTICES FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE TOBACCO CONTROL PROGRAMS (2014).  No similar guide yet exists for state-level 
programs to address the opioid epidemic (though the CDC has produced numerous publications that 
could inform aspects of such a program).  
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more tobacco products (and hence in opposing effective tobacco control 
measures), pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors are, for the most 
part, far more diversified and are already moving to develop alternatives 
to opioids that do not pose the same risk of addiction.147  They would be 
far less likely to actively oppose efforts to fund opioid treatment and 
prevention.148 
Nonetheless, even in this context, constitutional amendment 
campaigns would not necessarily be easy to win.  The recent defeat of 
Ohio Issue 1—designed, in part, to fund opioid treatment programs—was 
partially due to the opposition’s argument that, whatever the merits of the 
policy under discussion, specific policy changes and spending decisions 
should not be written into the state’s constitution.149  Moreover, as the use 
of ballot issues to undo or circumvent legislative decision-making has 
become more prevalent, legislatures in numerous states have sought to 
make it more difficult to pass constitutional amendments.150 
Use of constitutional amendments, therefore, is a difficult and risky 
strategy.  And indeed, only eighteen states allow for voters to directly 
initiate a constitutional amendment.151  Still, the experience of the MSA 
                                                          
 147.   Alex Keown, Increased Development of Non-Opioid Pain Treatments is Expected to 
Continue, BIOSPACE (June 29, 2018), https://www.biospace.com/article/increased-development-of-
non-opioid-pain-treatments-is-expected-to-continue/ [https://perma.cc/T5US-RXKG].  
 148.   Indeed, Purdue Pharma, as the owner of the company that holds the patent for 
Buprenorphine (used to treat opioid dependence), could benefit from expanded treatment efforts.  
Mark Terry, In Negotiations of 1,000 Opioid Lawsuits, Purdue Pharma Offers Free Opioid Therapy, 
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lawsuits-purdue-pharma-offers-free-opioid-therapy/ [https://perma.cc/G8AX-UGCP].  
 149.   See, e.g., Opinion, Enquirer Endorsement: No On Issue 1, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Nov. 4, 
2018, 7:09 AM), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/opinion/2018/11/04/enquirer-endorsement-no-
issue-1/1811742002/ [https://perma.cc/2CQK-8CKQ] (“[O]nce something is embedded in the 
constitution, as Issue 1 on Tuesday’s ballot proposes, it is written in stone and can be very challenging 
and expensive to undo.  That’s why The Enquirer’s editorial board is recommending that voters say 
NO to Issue 1.”). 
 150.   Alan Greenblatt, Lawmakers Eye Changes to Ballot Measures—Past and Future, 
GOVERNING (Jan. 16, 2019, 4:00 AM), http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-lawmakers-
block-ballot-measures.html [https://perma.cc/26SE-9V4W].  The tobacco industry has a history of 
working behind the scenes to make it more difficult to propose and adopt ballot issues.  Elizabeth 
Laposata, Allison P. Kennedy & Stanton A. Glantz, When Tobacco Targets Direct Democracy, 39 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 537 (2014).  
 151.   BALLOTPEDIA, Amending State Constitutions, https://ballotpedia.org/Amending_ 
state_constitutions [https://perma.cc/F53P-LGS8] (last visited Apr. 3, 2019).  In nearly every state, the 
state legislature can refer a constitutional amendment to the ballot.  Id.  This may be another approach 
to consider, though it would likely be difficult to persuade legislatures to propose constitutional 
amendments that would limit their own power.  As noted previously, a few states passed legislatively-
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CONTROL RES. AND ED. 56–61 (Nov. 1, 2005), https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd 
1058 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
suggests that this is a strategy worth considering where it is legally viable.  
Otherwise, public health advocates may expend enormous energy working 
to negotiate a plan for how settlement proceeds can be spent, only to see 
that agreed-upon framework (and newly-established programs) dissolve 
after a couple of years. 
CONCLUSION 
Former American Legacy Foundation CEO Cheryl Healton has 
warned against “Monday morning quarterback[ing]” the MSA, noting that 
“those who have critiqued the actual outcomes of the MSA were not 
participants in the settlement process and thus have little firsthand 
knowledge about what was possible.”152  That point has merit, but it does 
not excuse a failure to learn from the MSA’s mistakes when planning for 
the future.  The tragedy of the MSA is that it was a unique opportunity to 
build a sustainable tobacco control (or broader public health) 
infrastructure.  With only 18% of the MSA revenues, every state could 
have funded its tobacco control program at CDC-recommended levels, 
with no other funding needed.153  Such a foundation would have put us on 
the road towards ending the nation’s tobacco epidemic once and for all.  
Instead, the MSA produced a short-term increase in tobacco control 
funding, but the vast majority of MSA funds were soon diverted to other 
purposes. 
Like the MSA, a global opioid settlement agreement may be a once-
in-a-generation opportunity to secure funds needed to rebuild the 
country’s decimated public health infrastructure.  But time may be quickly 
running out to plan for such a settlement before it occurs, and the much 
larger number of jurisdictions involved makes planning much more 
complicated.154  This article has suggested some possible mechanisms 
through which those pursing the litigation could follow through on their 
expressed intention to ensure that funds are used (over the long term) for 
public health and opioid treatment.  If they fail to do so, states and 
localities should explore their own options for permanently dedicating a 
                                                          
/content/qt2rj5f9cr/qt2rj5f9cr.pdf?t=lnp4eb [https://perma.cc/VZ3D-TJ4G] (detailing how Montana’s 
constitutional amendment created a trust fund for health care and tobacco control programs, but 
because the amendment did not require any minimum level of appropriation for tobacco control, the 
state’s program remained underfunded).   
 152.   Healton, supra note 128, at 12S.   
 153.   Id. at 13S. 
 154.   Further complicating the planning is the fact that while we generally know what works to 
reduce tobacco use, the opioid epidemic is much more of a “wicked problem” where the solutions are 
far less clear.  See Jonathan C. Lee, The Opioid Crisis is a Wicked Problem, 27 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 
51 (2018). 
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significant portion of the funds to addressing the current public health 
crisis and preventing the next one.  The time to be making such fallback 
plans is now. 
 
